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Abstract:
This paper examines the responses of individuals to marginal tax rates in their reporting of  
income,  using the 2009 individual tax return data for Greece.  The method of regression  
quantiles is employed to provide evidence on behavioral responses at different points of the  
income  distribution.  The  results  reveal  significant  differences  in  the  marginal  tax  rate  
reporting responses across income classes and for different occupational groups; whereas  
high income taxpayers have a very elastic response. As particular groups of taxpayers have  
more flexibility in misreporting tax liability also depends on the government’s effectiveness  
to control tax avoidance. Evaluation of the 2010 tax reform further reveals that misreporting  
of the occupational groups Rental Income and Wages & Salaries appears to be the highest.  
Policy  recommendations  regarding  tax  reforms  should  therefore  take  into  account  the  
reported income distribution involved and the selected policy objectives.
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1. Introduction
The examination of the taxpayers’ behavioral response to changes in marginal tax 
rates is essential in estimating the impact of different tax policies so as to minimize 
the  individual’s  bias  and  avoid  erroneous  policy  recommendations.  The 
effectiveness  of  government  intervention  is  affected  by  changing  behavior,  as 
taxpayers’ reporting decisions are subject to the prevailing tax schedule. The lack of  
government revenues can also be partially explained by the potential responsiveness 
of taxpayers.  Given that  Greece is  considered a  country with a high rate  of tax 
avoidance and evasion, the estimation of the reported income elasticity could prove 
useful, especially for policy makers and taxpayer advocates, for the evaluation of  
alternative tax policies and the prediction of tax revenue effects.
Initially,  labor  supply elasticities  were used  to  design appropriate  tax  and fiscal  
policies,  though these are likely to underestimate taxpayers’  response to tax rate 
changes, measuring only how taxpayers alter their work schedule. Recent studies 
have used elasticities of (taxable) income, accounting explicitly for tax avoidance 
and implicitly for exclusions and deductions (e.g. Lindsey, 1987; Feldstein, 1995; 
Sammartino and Weiner, 1997; Auten and Carroll, 1999; Gruber and Saez, 2002). 
The  obtained  results  vary  though  considerably,  depending  on  the  method  of 
estimation  used,  the  particular  tax  reform  examined  and  the  country  under 
consideration.  Two reasons  may explain  the  conflicting  results.  First,  it  is  often 
problematic to compare reported income before and after a tax reform, as changes in 
the definition of taxable income are introduced apart from tax rate changes. Second, 
most  studies  attribute  the  widening  of  income inequality  to  tax  reforms,  though 
evidence has shown that other factors may have increased inequality. Nevertheless, 
results show that income heterogeneity should be considered when estimating the 
taxpayers’ reporting decision, as the responsiveness of taxable income to taxes may 
be higher in higher income classes, for which a larger share of income is likely to 
come in forms that are easier to hide from tax authorities (Thalassinos and Liapis,  
2013).
A suitable approach for this line of empirical analysis was recently employed by 
Alm and Wallace (2007 and 2010); namely quantile regression. Quantile regression 
was developed by Koenker and Bassett  (1978) as a robust alternative estimation 
technique compared to conditional mean regression against outliers,  and a useful 
approach in  cases  of  heteroskedasticity.  The magnitude  of  differential  responses 
across  income classes  can be  further  examined,  since  regression  quantiles  allow 
analyzing the responsiveness of a wide range of reporting behavior to marginal tax 
rates and the responses of individuals at different points of the income distribution; a 
task  that  is  not  investigated  thoroughly.  Both  empirical  studies  estimate  though 
taxpayers’ reporting decision using arbitrarily 'typical' quantiles such as 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 
0.8, which are very unlikely to always correspond to income classes that are taxed 
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differently so that the reported estimations may lead to a possible bias of the real 
magnitude of the differential  responses across income classes.  In addition,  using 
quintiles, that is a ‘truncation on the dependent variable’ that segments the sample 
into subsets based on its unconditional distribution, and doing least squares fitting 
on these subsets yields to inconsistent estimates (Koenker and Hallock, 2001). Such 
strategies  are  condemned  to  failure  for  all  the  reasons  so  carefully  laid  out  in 
Heckman’s  (1979)  work  on  sample  selection,  implying  that  the  reported  OLS 
quintiles  estimations  should  not  be  directly  compared  to  the  respective  quantile 
regression estimations. 
In this framework, this paper contributes to the examination of the responsiveness of  
a  wide  range  of  reporting  behavior  to  marginal  tax  rates  and  the  responses  of 
individuals  at  the  different  points  of  the  income  distribution  that  correspond  to 
specific tax brackets. The elasticity of earned income for the case of Greek taxpayers 
is estimated using quantile regressions that take into account heterogeneity, and a 
number of control variables. A rich dataset of individual tax returns for Greece is 
retrieved for the fiscal year 2009 to investigate whether marginal tax rates matter, as 
taxes might  affect differently the behavior of individuals with different  levels of  
income as  well  as  occupation.  Policy implications  are  also provided based on a 
scenario of the 2010 tax reform implementation a year earlier, using the new income 
tax schedule that includes nine brackets instead of four. Overall, this paper aims at  
providing  an  additional  tool  for  policy  makers’  decision  concerning  taxation 
reforms, who could consider not only a single elasticity of taxpayer responses, but 
also  the  differences  in  these  responses  based  on  taxpayers’  income  classes  and 
occupational groups.
The rest  of  the  paper is  organized as  follows.  Section 2 presents the  theoretical  
framework  underlying  the  income  elasticity  concept  and  analyzes  quantile 
regressions that are used for the empirical analysis. Section 3 provides the details as  
to the data used,  whereas Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical  results. 
Conclusions and policy implications are included in the final section.
2. Theory and Methodology
2.1. Theory
In the literature on behavioral responses, it is assumed that individuals maximize a 
utility function responding to taxation through different margins such as intensity of 
work, career choices, form and timing of compensation, portfolio investments and 
tax  avoidance  or  tax  evasion.  All  such  changes  in  behavior  involve  deadweight 
losses to the individual because they alter the way in which potential income is spent 
(e.g. on leisure, fringe benefits, tax-deductible consumption such as charitable gifts 
etc.). As a result, labor supply, investment interest, health insurance and charitable 
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consumption  are  just  some  of  the  factors  negatively  affected  when  tax  rates 
increases, since individual taxpayers try to reduce taxable income.
It is therefore assumed that an individual chooses how much of a fixed amount of 
income  M  to  report  as  taxable  income  R  and  how  much  to  allocate  to  tax 
avoidance activities A . Reported income R  is subject to a progressive income tax 
schedule  ( )RT ,  where  0>′T  and  0>′′T .  The  individual  may  though  reduce 
income subject to taxation by engaging in tax avoidance at some cost, ( )MAC / , in 
order to pay, for instance, for tax advice. This cost is assumed to be conditional upon 
total earned income, with 0>′C  and 0>′′C . The individual chooses then R  and 
A  to maximize income net of taxes and avoidance costs. The impact of an upward 
shift in marginal tax rates, t , on the individual’s reporting decision can be denoted 
by:
( ) ( )[ ]MACRT/-tR/ /1 ′′+′′=∂∂ (1)
with the income marginal tax rate elasticity η  defined as ( ) ( )[ ]RttR // ∂∂≡η  and 
the corresponding income tax price elasticity θ  equal to:
( )( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )[ ]ttRttR /1/11/ −−=−−∂∂≡ ηθ (2)
This elasticity aims to capture all potential responses to income taxation in a single  
measure, without the need to specify the nature of the various different types of  
response such as labor supply changes, income shifting between sources which are 
taxed at different rates,  and tax evasion through non-declaration of income. It  is 
expected that an increase in marginal tax rates will reduce the amount of income that 
an individual reports on tax returns. The income elasticity refers then to substitution 
from taxed to untaxed goods, but also to avoidance and evasion. Tax avoidance and 
evasion are here considered as a single activity; namely the activity of not declaring 
incomes that would be taxed. In all cases, taxpayers will undertake behavior that  
reduces tax liability up to the point that the marginal cost equals the marginal tax 
saving. In the case of substitution, the cost is an otherwise unattractive bundle of  
goods;  for  avoidance,  the  cost  may be  expenditures  on  tax  advice;  whereas  for  
evasion, the cost may be exposure to the uncertainty of an audit and any attendant  
penalties for detected evasion (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 1996).
As  Goolsbee  (1998)  stresses  though,  tax  avoidance  and  evasion  depend  on  the 
enforcement system in place, so that the standard assumption of a constant elasticity 
across  individuals  becomes  even  more  untenable  than  usual.  Higher  income 
individuals are apt to have more flexibility in their reporting decisions due to their 
larger  financial  resources  and  their  greater  access  to  sophisticated  tax  advice.  
Moreover, the taxpayers’ occupation may reflect the flexibility to alter their work 
schedule or compensation arrangements in response to tax rate changes. To deal 
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with these problems, separate elasticities will be estimated for different occupational 
groups  and  based  on  different  income  classes.  In  addition,  a  robust  estimation 
technique will  be employed allowing examining whether the reporting responses 
differ  at  different  points  of  the  income distribution,  taking  into  account  outliers 
whom are often observed in individual income tax returns datasets.
It should also be mentioned that the marginal tax rate is likely to be endogenous,  
even if rates’ endogeneity in a progressive income tax schedule is a general problem 
that plagues just about all  empirical work on the behavioral response to taxation 
(Slemrod, 1998). Exogenous variation in behavior that affects reported income may 
push  an  individual  into  a  higher  marginal  tax  rate  bracket,  thus  producing  a 
correlation between the behavior  and the measured marginal  tax rate  that  is  not 
indicative in any way of a behavioral elasticity. A number of different approaches 
have been adapted to this problem and various instruments have been used, such as 
education  and  occupation.  In  this  paper,  various  taxpayer  characteristics  are 
introduced  as  non-tax  factors  to  examine  the  impact  of  marginal  tax  rates  on 
taxpayers’  decisions  to  report  income  (e.g.  marital  status,  family  size  and 
occupation).
2.2. Methodology
Starting with the dependent variable, the total Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) is used 
before any deductions, exclusions or exemptions are taken. This definition of total 
income captures the sum of an individual’s income from all sources minus certain 
expenses  and  other  ‘adjustments’.  Subtracting  ‘itemized  deductions’  from  AGI 
results  in  ‘taxable  income’.  In  Greece  though,  the  large  bulk  of  items  that  are 
deductible from taxable income (mortgage interest deduction, charitable giving etc.) 
may generate (fiscal) externalities, so that the elasticity of a broader pre-deduction 
concept of income is of more importance rather than taxable income. The analysis 
focuses then on the extent  to which individuals’  income as a whole responds to 
changes in marginal tax rates3.
The sample used is also divided into six main subgroups based on the occupational  
group  in  which  each  individual  is  categorized,  in  order  to  analyze  whether  the 
determinants of reporting behavior affect subgroups of the population differentially. 
The  reporting  behavior  of  individuals  having  different  occupation  is  therefore 
examined separating the sample based on the main income source of each taxpayer 
and into the subgroups of Rental Income, Business Income, Farm Income, Wages &  
Salaries,  Self-employment  Income, and  Pension.  Business  Income is  defined  as 
income coming from all business activities (incorporated and unincorporated) apart 
from the one from self-employed activities; whereas Self-employment Income refers 
to profits from small businesses that are fully owned by the taxpayer.
3 Capital gains are excluded because their tax treatment is special and non-comparable.
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In terms of the explanatory variables, the  Marginal Tax Rate used is based on the 
four-bracket national tax system ranging from 0% to 40%, for the fiscal year 2009.  
In addition, the fact that the timing of the 2010 Greek tax reform coincided with an 
economic crisis renders the estimation of the behavioral responses to this reform 
rather  complicated.  As  a  result,  data  for  2009  are  also  expected  to  be  more 
‘informative’  concerning tax  liability  in  Greece  for  the  year  2011,  and thus  are 
extensively analyzed using a scenario for the implementation of the 2010 tax reform 
a year earlier. Figure 1 presents the tax brackets in Greece for both tax systems. The 
Marginal Tax Rate is measured as a percentage and is based on total income, being 
adjusted for the child exemptions4.
Other  variables  include  the  Squared  Marginal  Tax  Rate,  which  is  a  common 
approximation used for the estimation of welfare costs of taxes, assuming that the 
excess burden of a tax change increases approximately in proportion to the square of 
the  tax  rate.  This  proxy  serves  then  to  highlight  the  fact  that  as  tax  rates  are 
increased  in  general,  the  distortionary  impacts  will  worsen  more  than 
proportionately. Dummies for the number of dependent  Children reported by the 
sample individuals are also used; as well as a dummy variable for the Marital Status 
equal to one if the taxpayer is married and zero otherwise. A dummy variable for the  
reporters’ Sex is denoted by one if he is male and zero for females; and six dummies 
for the different income sources referring to the abovementioned individuals’ main 
occupational group are further introduced. Finally, dummies for residence in each of 
Greece’s twelve regions are included, together with dummies for residence in two 
metropolitan areas (Attica and Thessaloniki).
Figure 1: Tax brackets in Greece
Note: Income coming from Wages & Salaries and Pension 
are excluded from the 15% tax rate.
4 Child exemptions in 2009 were €1,000 for each of the first two children; €10,000 for the third child; 
and €1,000 for every child above the third. The 2010 tax reform increased the exemption for the first  
two children to €1,500 each; to €11,500 for the third child; and to €2,000 for every child above the 
third.
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Concerning the empirical approach used, a robust estimator that takes heterogeneity 
of  the  dependent  variable  into  account  is  employed,  namely  quantile  regression 
(Koenker and Basset, 1978). This approach involves the estimation of conditional 
quantiles, rather than estimation of coefficients at a single measure of the mean. In 
the  quantile  regression,  the  median is  defined as  the  solution to  the  problem of 
minimizing a sum of absolute residuals, similarly to the sample mean used as the 
solution to the problem of minimizing a sum of squared residuals. The use of least 
squares regression leads though to biased estimates of the parameters included in the 
analysis when the data are heteroskedastic due to variable variations in the sample. 
Using quantile regression, the sets of slope parameters of the conditional quantile 
functions differ from each other, as well as from the least squares slope parameters. 
Estimating  conditional  quantiles  at  various  points  of  the  distribution  of  the 
dependent variable allows then for tracing out different marginal responses of the 
dependent variable to changes in the covariates at these points (Jayachandran et al., 
2002). In this framework, the taxpayer reporting decisions of a marginal change in 
tax rates is estimated, taking into account the taxpayers’ characteristics (e.g. source 
of  income,  marital  status  etc.)  at  different  points  of  the  conditional  income 
distribution. OLS estimates showing the mean effects of these covariates are also 
presented for reasons of comparison.
The quantile regression model is defined as:
τiτii εβzR +=  with ( ) τiiiτ βzzRQ = (3)
where 
iR  is the reported income of the ith sample taxpayer, 
i = 1,..,N, 
iz  is a vector of individual characteristics. ( )iiτ zRQ  denotes  the  τth  conditional  quantile  of  iR  given  iz  and  τβ  is  the 
unknown  vector  of  parameters  to  be  estimated.  The  τth  regression  quantile  (
10 << τ ) solves the individual taxpayer’s minimizing problem:
( )




′
−−+′− ∑∑
′<′≥ τiiτiiτ βzi:R
τii
βzi:R
τii
β
βzRτβzRτ
NMin
11
(4)
Any  quantile  of  the  distribution  of  iR ,  conditional  on  iz  can  be  obtained  by 
changing τ from zero to one. This continuous change of τ relaxes the assumption of  
iid errors (ε ) upon which the least square regression depends. Consequently, the 
parameter estimates are not assumed to be the same at all points on the conditional 
distribution. Moreover, analysis can be focused on the upper tail of the positively 
skewed income distribution since only the above median quantiles correspond to 
income classes that are taxed.
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3. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The analysis is based upon the 2009 dataset of individual tax returns provided by the 
Greek General Secretariat for Information Systems, Ministry of Finance. A micro-
level  dataset  is  essentially  used  that  contains  detailed  information  on  individual 
observations  from  a  stratified  random  sample  of  taxpayers  in  Greece.  The 
representative sample includes 566,652 individual records (about 10% of the total  
number of taxpayers), and each record contains information from actual individual 
income tax returns, excluding the taxpayers’ name, tax identification numbers, and 
other identifying information (e.g. address of residence).
Based on this sample,  a brief analysis of  the Greek taxpayers’  income and their  
characteristics follows. As shown in Table 1, more than 50% of the individuals earn 
their income either from wages and salaries or pensions. A considerable 10% of 
taxpayers  report  as  rents  their  main  income  source,  whereas  the  smallest  share 
appears to be the one for self-employees. In particular, individuals categorized in the 
Pension subgroup  account  for  almost  30%,  while  those  of  Farm and  Self-
Employment subgroups amount less than 7%, respectively. Moreover, 50.35% of the 
sample consists of married taxpayers and the remaining are single; whereas about 
one third of individuals are women. The majority of taxpayers are childless, and 
only a fraction has more than four children. Finally, most of the individuals included 
in the sample live in the region of Attica that refers mainly to the city of Athens.
Table 1: Taxpayers’ characteristics
Income Source, % Regions, % Regions, %
Rental 10.50 Attica 38.42 Thessaly 6.41
Business 12.30 East Macedonia & Thrace 5.20 West Greece 5.76
Farm 6.89 Central Macedonia 7.03 Peloponnese 5.32
Wages & Salaries 35.77 Thessaloniki 9.89 Central Greece 4.77
Self-employment 6.56 West Macedonia 2.54 North Aegean 1.79
Pension 27.96 Epirus 2.88 South Aegean 2.84
Child, % Ionian Islands 1.98 Crete 5.18
0 75.71 Sex, % Marital status, %1 10.44
2 10.92 Male 73.47 Yes 50.35
3 2.36 Female 26.53 No 49.65
≥4 0.57
The distribution of taxpayers’ income per occupational group is presented in Figure 
2.  From the  boxplot,  50% of  the  individuals  in  each  group receive  at  least  the 
median income; while the lower edge of each box corresponds to the 25th percentile 
and the upper edge to the 75th percentile. Half of the individuals included in the 
different occupational groups report income between these values. Those reporting 
income from rents appear to have the lowest median, though 25% receive more than 
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€4,750. Relatively significant income scatter is observed for the subgroup of self-
employees, since 50% of those report €15,445, but 25% have income lower than 
€7,800, and 25% at least €27,000. The average income per taxpayer declaring wages 
and salaries as the main source of income amounts to €15,506 per year, while the 
average  declared  income  for  taxpayers  whose  income  is  obtained  mainly  from 
sources other than wages and pensions (excluding agriculture) is €13,210. For the 
subgroup  of  Wages  &  Salaries in  particular,  only  8.66%  report  income  above 
€30,000  and  59%  are  under  some  sort  of  tax  exemption  (including  child 
exemptions). Overall,  the mean and median total income in 2009 is €13,733 and 
€10,386,  respectively.  The top income class  contains  individuals who earn more 
than €75,000 and represent 0.68% of the sample.
Figure 2: Distribution of taxpayers’ income by different occupational groups, fiscal year 2009
It should be here noted that although the two top marginal tax rates in 2009 (35% 
and 40%) were applied at a relatively low level of income threshold (of €30,000 and 
€75,000, respectively), the effective tax rate applied to the income class where the 
bulk of taxpayers is concentrated (i.e. €13,000 - 27,000) is 25%. It is also important 
to note that Greece has a rather large ‘zero’ tax bracket (up to €12,000 that increases 
with the child exemptions); whereas 3.3 million taxpayers (or about 58% of the total 
number of tax forms submitted to tax authorities) report average income below the 
tax-free level.  Finally,  the effective taxation of non-wage income is  very low in 
Greece,  mostly  due  to  under-reporting  of  income  by  self-employed  individuals 
(Statistical Bulletin, 2010).
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Estimation of income-tax price elasticities
The distribution of the individuals’ income, presented in Figure 3, provides evidence 
of  a  highly  skewed  distribution  with  a  long  right  tail,  implying  considerable 
heterogeneity and thus justifying the use of quantile regression. In addition, formal 
12 European Research Studies,  XVI (2), 2013E.A. Kaditi - E.I. Nitsi
testing leads to a rejection of normality, since the D’Agostino et al. (1990) skewness 
test  indicates that  the depended variable is  positively skewed at  the 1% level  of 
significance (skewness=857.72). 
Figure 3: Income distribution, fiscal year 2009
As a result,  the empirical analysis examines the effects of the various covariates 
mentioned previously on different points of the reported income distribution using 
regression quantiles. The analysis focuses on the upper tail of the  AGI distribution 
since only the above median quantiles correspond to the specified income classes.  
The results obtained for AGI are shown in Table 2, where the corresponding AGI of 
eleven different quantiles is reported based on the relevant tax brackets. The income 
classes have been adapted to capture the brackets of both the tax system for the  
fiscal year 2009 and of the 2010 tax reform; whereas the OLS estimation results are 
reported in the first column of the table. In the Annex, Table A1 summarizes the 
estimation results when using as dependent variable the  AGI for the six different 
occupational groups. In all cases, the numbers in parentheses signify the standard 
errors.  Furthermore,  formal testing has been performed to check if  the estimated 
quantile  regression  relationships  conform  to  the  location  shift  hypothesis  that 
assumes all of the conditional quantile functions to have the same slope parameters.  
Using the ANOVA test proposed by Koenker and Basset (1982), the results show 
that in all cases the relevant hypothesis has been decisively rejected indicating that  
even  quantiles  close  to  each  other  exhibit  statistically  significant  different  slope 
parameters.
Normal
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Table 2: OLS and quantile regression estimates for total income*
14 European Research Studies,  XVI (2), 2013E.A. Kaditi - E.I. Nitsi
The quantile regression estimates are also summarized using a plot for each of the 
five  main  covariates  (and  the  intercept)  included  in  the  model  (Figure  4).  The 
dummies  for  the  different  income  sources  referring  to  individuals’  main 
occupational group, as well as for residence in Greece’s regions are not included for  
sake of brevity. In particular, ninety-nine distinct quantile regression estimates are 
presented for a (horizontal) quantile scale ranging from 0.01 to 0.99 as the solid 
curve  with  filled  dots.  The  shaded  grey  area  depicts  a  90  per  cent  pointwise 
confidence band for the quantile regression estimates. The dotted line in each figure 
shows the OLS estimate of the conditional mean effect,  whereas the two dashed 
lines represent conventional 90 per cent confidence intervals for the least squares 
estimate.
In the first panel of the Figure, the intercept of the model can be interpreted as the 
estimated conditional quantile function of the AGI distribution of a taxpayer who is 
a single female, without children, located in Attica and is categorized in the Rental  
Income occupational  group.  Each of  the  other  plots  gives  information about  the 
relevant covariate. At any chosen quantile, the question that can be answered is how 
different  is  the  response  of  AGI  from  the  corresponding  variable,  given  a 
specification of all other conditioning factors. At the upper quantile, the covariate of 
main  interest,  the  Marginal  Tax  Rate,  tends  to  be  especially  steep  implying  a 
significant  increase  of  income  misreporting.  It  is  also  clear  that  the  disparity 
observed for the quantile estimates cannot be captured by the OLS estimates, and the 
same holds for all covariates.
Figure 4: OLS and Quantile regression estimates
In addition, Table 3 includes the marginal tax rate elasticities for the total reported 
income using both empirical approaches (i.e. quantile regression and OLS), while a 
similar Table is provided in the Annex for the income elasticities of the different  
occupational groups (Table A2). All elasticities are calculated using the mean values 
of the tax rates and of the taxpayers’ income at the appropriate quantile. Moreover,  
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the change in reported income for  each income class is  also reported,  using the 
average, high and low income values of the specific quantile.
Table 3: Income- tax price elasticities and estimated misreporting of tax increases for 
total income
Quantile Mean Estimation
Elasticities Misreporting from 1% increase in tax rates
lower average upper lower average upper
>100,001 -0.0059 -587.49 -974.06 -8,488.37
-
138.30 -305.74
-
2,664.39
75,001-
100,000 -0.0082 -615.90 -698.22 -821.19
-
138.30 -225.81 -184.40
60,001-75,000 -0.0070 -418.34 -463.56 -522.91
-
110.64 -122.60 -138.30
40,001-60,000 -0.0066 -263.61 -312.86 -395.40 -73.76 -87.54 -110.64
32,001-40,000 -0.0079 -254.35 -282.22 -317.92 -59.01 -65.48 -73.76
30,001-32,000 -0.0089 -265.95 -274.45 -283.67 -55.32 -57.09 -59.01
26,001-30,000 -0.0067 -173.77 -186.13 -200.50 -47.95 -51.36 -55.32
22,001-26,000 -0.0072 -159.41 -173.07 -188.38 -40.57 -44.05 -47.94
16,001-22,000 -0.0075 -120.11 -140.86 -165.14 -29.51 -34.61 -40.57
12,001-16,000 -0.0090 -107.45 -123.97 -143.26 -22.13 -25.53 -29.50
10,501-12,000 -0.0052 -54.27 -58.15 -62.02 -19.36 -20.75 -22.13
OLS -0.0018 : : : -19.36 -25.32
-
2,664.39
Considering first the impact of marginal tax rates on the average reporting behavior 
for  the  entire  sample,  the  OLS results  indicate  that  the  marginal  tax  rate  has  a 
negative and statistically significant impact on reported income, suggesting that as  
the  marginal  tax  rate  increases  the  level  of  reporting  income  decreases.  The 
associated elasticity is calculated at the mean value of the marginal tax rate and total  
reporting  income  and  is  found  to  be  negative  (-0.002).  The  marginal  tax  rate 
coefficient and elasticity result are consistent with the theoretical model, though the 
obtained  estimates  are  not  comparable  to  those  generated  with  the  regression 
quantiles.  These  results  illustrate  several  different  behavioral  aspects  and  large 
disparities along the different quantiles. For instance, the elasticities are all negative 
ranging from -0.005 to -0.009. It also appears that there is a slight tendency for the 
elasticities to decline in absolute size at the higher quantiles, as the level of reported 
income for individuals at the relevant quantile increases in size more rapidly than 
the relevant marginal tax rate.
Moreover, the OLS estimation results are very similar  to the quantile results for 
those  reporting  total  income  between  €26,000  and  €30,000.  For  individuals 
reporting more that €100,000, the coefficient of the  Marginal Tax Rate is -6.335, 
while the coefficient of the Squared Marginal Tax Rate is 0.282. Given the marginal 
tax rate of the individual with the mean value of total income, these estimates imply 
that a one percentage point increase in the marginal tax rate reduces the reporting 
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income by €974 at this income class. A similar one percentage point increase in the 
marginal  tax rate lowers the reporting income by €274 for an individual  earning 
between €30,000-32,000.
The variables concerning the individual characteristics have a small to infinitesimal 
effect  in  the  higher  income  classes,  when  they  are  statistically  significant.  For 
instance,  for  income classes  less  than €40,000,  single  females  tend to  misreport 
income  more  than  their  married  counterparts,  while  having  more  children  is 
positively correlated with taxpayers’ reported income. The estimated coefficients for 
the dummy variables of the different occupational groups indicate that those earning 
income mainly from rents have a different behavior from the individuals earning 
their  income from the alternative sources.  It  appears  that  up to  €40,000,  Rental  
Income has  a  significant  negative  effect  on  reported  income,  while  above  that 
amount  Wages  &  Salaries and  Pension  exhibit  the  same  impact  on  AGI,  and 
becomes larger as they move to the highest income classes. Moreover, the impact of 
the dummy variables concerning the taxpayers’ residence on AGI is insignificant for 
income above €60,000, implying that for the high income individuals residence is 
not a factor that affects their behavior. For income classes below this threshold, it 
appears that being located at the city of Athens has a positive impact contrary to all  
other regions.
When examining the different occupational groups, the marginal tax rate effects are 
considerably differentiated both across occupational groups and income classes. The 
coefficient of the Marginal Tax Rate for the highest income class ranges from -2.311 
for  Self-Employment Income to -11.200 for  Wages & Salaries, while in the lowest 
income class the disparity is from -0.162 for Farm Income to -0.689 for Wages & 
Salaries. The effect of the Squared Marginal Tax Rate exhibits a similar pattern. 
Consequently,  the  tax  price  elasticities  vary  considerably  across  occupational 
groups.  The  calculated  elasticities  for  all  occupational  groups  as  well  as  for  all 
taxpayers are presented in Figure 5. The OLS elasticity is not shown but it has to be 
noted that it is smaller than any elasticities provided by the quantile estimates. The 
mean  estimation  may  therefore  lead  to  miscalculation  of  a  possible  income 
misreporting. In terms of the occupational groups up to €30,000, all groups with the 
exception of Rental Income exhibit similar price tax elasticities with small variations 
suggesting that lower income taxpayers have fewer opportunities to misreport. It is  
interesting  thought  that  this  is  not  the  case  for  Rental  Income,  as  the  price  tax 
elasticity is relatively high, deviating significantly from all other groups for income 
up to €60,000. This may be attributed to the fact that  Rental Income is reported in 
such a way that makes tax avoidance easier.
On the other hand, the elasticity for  Wages & Salaries tends to deviate from this 
trend for income more than €30,000 and the highest elasticities are observed above 
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€60,000. The results suggest that middle income earners react to marginal rates by 
reducing  the  reported  labor  supply,  either  by  working  less  or  shifting  to  the 
underground economy. It is also possible that these individuals report income from 
more than one source which results in avoidance of reporting income. Moreover, the 
lowest elasticity for income up to €60,000 is observed for the subgroup  Pension, 
though it increases considerably at the higher income classes, so that it overcomes 
even the elasticity of  Rental Income.  This result  indicates that pensioners having 
high income that probably comes also from sources other than their main pension 
are likely to avoid reporting their total income. 
Figure 5: Income-tax price elasticities by occupational group
Finally, in the upper income classes, the case of  Self-Employment Income exhibits 
the lowest elasticity. It should be though noted that in Greece self-employees are 
those who have more flexibility in their reporting decisions as they can easily alter  
their work schedule or compensation arrangements, shifting even to the underground 
economy.  Taking  this  into  account,  the  starting  level  of  the  reported  income is 
effectively underestimated affecting the empirical results reported here. This is in 
accordance to the fact that taxpayers of the subgroup Wages & Salaries with high 
income appear to respond more to tax increases than those of the other occupational 
groups. These individuals are very likely to have income sources other than their 
wages and as they are the least audited group by tax authorities, they tend to reduce 
their  tax liability.  Overall,  it  can be  argued that  misreporting  increases  for  high 
income individuals despite their occupation.
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4.2. Analysis of the "2010 tax reform" scenario
Based on the analysis so far, the choice of the elasticity used in policy simulations is 
essential and has a significant impact on the results obtained, that is tax revenues. 
Given the 2010 tax reform and the new tax structure shown in Figure 1, a scenario 
concerning the taxpayers’ reporting decision is here examined. The analysis focuses 
in the upper quantiles excluding the 'zero' tax bracket. The reported results concern 
both empirical  methods used for the average,  lower and upper estimation of the 
misreported income in each income class. A similar table is further provided in the 
Annex  (Table  A3)  for  the  corresponding  scenario  of  the  different  occupational  
groups.
As expected, the individuals facing the highest increase in tax rates are those who 
may have the greatest response. Taxpayers earning more than €100,000 experience a 
5% increase in their marginal tax rate and are likely to avoid reporting income that 
ranges from almost €3,000 up to €42,500. In addition, individuals belonging in the 
income class of €60,001-75,000 and those having income between €26,001-30,000 
are likely to misreport up to €2,600. On the opposite side, those who are taxed at 
lower  tax  rates  will  probably  show  a  positive  response  raising  their  reporting 
income. For instance, taxpayers of the lowest income class are not taxed under the 
2010 tax reform and as a result they may increase their reported income at a rather 
high rate. Moreover, those who remain at the same tax bracket will probably not  
change  their  behavior  (e.g.  those  earning  from €75,001-100,000).  It  is  therefore 
apparent that the new tax brackets could lead to differential taxpayers’ responses at  
different points of the reported income distribution.
Table 4: Scenario for the 2010 Greek tax reform on total income
Quantile Mean estimation
lower average upper lower average upper
>100,001 -2,937.43 -4,870.29 -42,441.86 -922.02 -1,528.72 -13,321.94
75,001-100,000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
60,001-75,000 -2,091.68 -2,317.79 -2,614.56 -553.22 -613.02 -691.51
40,001-60,000 -790.82 -938.57 -1,186.20 -221.29 -262.63 -331.92
32,001-40,000 -254.35 -282.22 -317.92 -59.01 -65.48 -73.76
30,001-32,000 797.86 823.35 851.02 165.97 171.27 177.03
26,001-30,000 -1,216.39 -1,302.89 -1,403.47 -335.63 -359.49 -387.25
22,001-26,000 -159.41 -173.07 -188.38 -40.57 -44.05 -47.94
16,001-22,000 120.11 140.86 165.14 29.51 34.61 40.57
12,001-16,000 752.17 867.80 1,002.81 154.91 178.73 206.53
10,501-12,000 814.12 872.24 930.33 290.46 311.20 331.92
In comparison to the results obtained from the quantile regression, the corresponding 
OLS estimates clearly underestimate the taxpayers’ responses, as their magnitude in 
most cases is more than fourfold, which supports the choice of quantile regression. 
The results also deviate significantly among occupational subgroups and especially 
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at the highest income class. Misreporting for the subgroup Wages & Salaries ranges 
from almost €5,000 to €71,000, followed by Rental Income (€3,500-39,900). On the 
other hand, the results concerning the subgroup Pension appear to have the smallest  
differentiation, which is from €4,300 to €9,600. Finally, similar results are obtained 
for the other income classes.
5. Conclusions
Changes in marginal tax rates induce taxpayers to alter their behavior in ways that  
affect their reported income. The magnitude of this response is of critical importance 
in the formulation of tax and fiscal policies. The marginal impact of taxation can be 
accurately summarized using the response of reported income to the income tax rate.  
This paper reports then new estimates of the responsiveness of taxpayers to changes 
in marginal tax rates using quantile regressions as a robust estimation technique.
The income elasticity, as matter of government policy, was empirically examined 
for the case of Greece and it was used to evaluate the 2010 tax reform, having a  
stratified  representative  sample  of  566,652  taxpayers.  Regression  quantiles  were 
further employed, rather than rely on mean estimations, so that the marginal tax rate 
responses  at  different  points  of  the  income  distribution  indicate  the  differential 
responses of individuals at different income classes. Spanning the tax changes of the 
2010 tax reform, the analysis considers to what extent taxpayers may change their 
reported incomes in response to changes in tax rates, controlling for non-tax factors 
as well,  such as  the taxpayer’s marital  status,  family size,  occupation,  region of 
residence etc.
The  obtained  results  show that  the  price  tax  elasticity  of  total  reported  income 
ranges from -0.005 to -0.009, whereas the change in tax rates according to the 2010 
tax  reform  may  result  in  a  significant  reduction  of  income  reported  by  the 
individuals at the highest income class. In addition, tax price elasticities appear to 
vary considerably across occupational groups. Using different subsamples for this 
criterion,  results  revealed  again  that  misreporting  increases  for  high  income 
individuals. A tax-induced change is, therefore, a fundamental factor with an impact  
on  the  incentives  of  high-income  individuals  for  reporting  income.  Taking  into 
account that particular groups of taxpayers have more flexibility and incentives in 
(mis)reporting  and  are  in  general  considered  less  tax  liable,  the  results  provide 
evidence  of  the  fact  that  wage  earners  tend  to  avoid  taxation  more  than  self-
employees and businessmen, as they are the least audited by tax authorities. On the  
other hand, lower income taxpayers have fewer opportunities and/or intensives to 
misreport with the exception of those individuals who earn rental income.
In terms of the scenario examined regarding the implementation of the 2010 tax 
reform a year earlier, it can be concluded that individuals facing the highest increase 
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in tax rates are those who will probably have the greatest response, as expected. On 
the other  hand,  those who will  be taxed at  lower  tax rates are  likely to show a 
positive response raising their reported income, while those who will remain at the 
same  tax  bracket  are  not  expected  to  change  their  behavior.  The  employed 
estimation  technique,  regression  quantiles,  allowed  also  the  examination  of  the 
marginal impact of taxation at different points of the reported income distribution 
revealing that  the mean estimates of the differential  responses of individuals are  
clearly  underestimated.  In  a  similar  manner,  the  results  are  differentiated  when 
examining the behavior of taxpayers for different occupational groups. 
Consequently,  policy  recommendations  should  take  into  account  the  income 
distribution  involved  and  the  selected  policy  objectives.  That  is,  policy  makers 
should  not  only  consider  a  single  elasticity  for  the  taxpayer  response,  but  the 
differences in these responses by income classes and occupational groups. Quantile 
regression proves to be a suitable approach by estimating a wide range of elasticities 
taking into account taxpayers’ heterogeneity. Particular attention should be given, 
finally,  to  the  instruments  used  to  control  tax  avoidance and/or  evasion of  high 
income individuals, as well as of occupational groups who have the flexibility not to 
report taxable income.
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Annex
Table A1: OLS and quantile regression estimates* for different types of income
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Table A2: Income-tax price elasticities  and estimated  misreporting for different 
occupational groups
Elasticities
Misreporting from 1% increase in tax 
rates Elasticities
Misreporting from 1% 
increase in tax rates
lower average upper lower average upper
Rental Business
>100,001 -0.0069 -690.55 -1,197.55 -7,980.14 -0.0046 -462.34 -764.85 -5,342.87
75,001-100,000 -0.0112 -840.93 -957.21 -1,121.22 -0.0065 -490.94 -558.16 -654.58
60,001-75,000 -0.0103 -618.19 -688.76 -772.73 -0.0061 -368.09 -407.67 -460.10
40,001-60,000 -0.0106 -425.14 -510.02 -637.70 -0.0061 -242.02 -288.65 -363.02
32,001-40,000 -0.0119 -381.60 -426.10 -476.99 -0.0073 -233.13 -259.56 -291.41
30,001-32,000 -0.0132 -395.77 -408.78 -422.15 -0.0082 -246.23 -254.08 -262.63
26,001-30,000 -0.0099 -256.35 -274.92 -295.77 -0.0065 -169.26 -181.43 -195.29
22,001-26,000 -0.0098 -215.52 -234.55 -254.70 -0.0073 -160.59 -174.42 -189.78
16,001-22,000 -0.0114 -182.17 -212.26 -250.47 -0.0077 -122.61 -143.54 -168.58
12,001-16,000 -0.0140 -168.14 -194.17 -224.17 -0.0092 -110.78 -128.71 -147.69
10,501-12,000 -0.0099 -103.94 -111.30 -118.78 -0.0056 -58.89 -63.17 -67.29
Farm Wages & Salaries
>100,001 -0.0049 -486.82 -825.27 -3,894.93 -0.0099 -988.74 -1,613.78
-
14,285.9
0
75,001-100,000 -0.0081 -604.43 -682.30 -805.90 -0.0127 -950.16 -1,075.07 -1,266.86
60,001-75,000 -0.0067 -399.49 -444.99 -499.35 -0.0106 -636.26 -705.54 -795.31
40,001-60,000 -0.0055 -221.44 -259.82 -332.16 -0.0084 -337.58 -401.24 -506.36
32,001-40,000 -0.0067 -215.14 -237.87 -268.92 -0.0097 -311.66 -345.70 -389.56
30,001-32,000 -0.0075 -223.72 -230.62 -238.63 -0.0107 -321.94 -332.25 -343.40
26,001-30,000 -0.0058 -150.37 -161.42 -173.50 -0.0075 -195.63 -209.25 -225.71
22,001-26,000 -0.0062 -135.42 -147.19 -160.03 -0.0078 -171.73 -186.15 -202.95
16,001-22,000 -0.0069 -110.54 -129.77 -151.99 -0.0074 -118.50 -138.68 -162.93
12,001-16,000 -0.0084 -101.09 -115.22 -134.77 -0.0084 -101.03 -116.59 -134.69
10,501-12,000 -0.0060 -63.14 -67.29 -72.15 -0.0046 -48.18 -51.72 -55.06
Self-employment Pension
>100,001 -0.0038 -375.14 -627.91 -4,458.56 -0.0086 -855.47 -1053.38 -1920.15
75,001-100,000 -0.0051 -382.07 -433.19 -509.41 -0.0067 -504.06 -564.68 -672.07
60,001-75,000 -0.0048 -289.40 -321.43 -361.75 -0.0055 -329.99 -359.94 -412.48
40,001-60,000 -0.0059 -235.07 -283.94 -352.60 -0.0058 -230.13 -267.14 -345.19
32,001-40,000 -0.0056 -178.20 -269.06 -222.74 -0.0060 -193.30 -213.74 -241.62
30,001-32,000 -0.0086 -256.62 -264.90 -273.72 -0.0065 -193.52 -199.69 -206.42
26,001-30,000 -0.0066 -170.57 -183.18 -196.81 -0.0047 -122.93 -131.69 -141.84
22,001-26,000 -0.0071 -156.91 -170.80 -185.43 -0.0050 -110.67 -120.28 -130.78
16,001-22,000 -0.0074 -117.88 -139.91 -162.07 -0.0058 -92.96 -109.25 -127.81
12,001-16,000 -0.0090 -108.19 -125.11 -144.24 -0.0075 -89.98 -103.49 -119.96
10,501-12,000 -0.0056 -58.29 -62.53 -66.61 -0.0048 -50.32 -53.76 -57.50
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Table A3. Scenario for the 2010 Greek tax reform in tax rates
by occupational group
lower average upper lower average upper lower average upper
Rent Business Self-employed
>100,001 -3,452.74 -5,987.77 -39,900.71 -2,311.68 -3,824.26 -26,714.35 -1,875.69 -3,139.53 -22,292.78
75,001-100,000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
60,001-75,000 -3,090.97 -3,443.78 -3,863.65 -1,840.44 -2,038.34 -2,300.51 -1,447.02 -1,607.16 -1,808.75
40,001-60,000 -1,275.43 -1,530.06 -1,913.10 -726.06 -865.96 -1,089.06 -705.21 -851.82 -1,057.79
32,001-40,000 -381.60 -426.10 -476.99 -233.13 -259.56 -291.41 -178.20 -269.06 -222.74
30,001-32,000 1,187.32 1,226.33 1,266.44 738.68 762.24 787.90 769.87 794.71 821.17
26,001-30,000 -1,794.42 -1,924.46 -2,070.41 -1,184.83 -1,269.99 -1,367.06 -1,194.01 -1,282.24 -1,377.65
22,001-26,000 -215.52 -234.55 -254.70 -160.59 -174.42 -189.78 -156.91 -170.80 -185.43
16,001-22,000 182.17 212.26 250.47 122.61 143.54 168.58 117.88 139.91 162.07
12,001-16,000 1,177.00 1,359.17 1,569.20 775.44 900.96 1,033.83 757.34 875.75 1,009.70
10,501-12,000 1,559.15 1,669.50 1,781.72 883.30 947.48 1,009.40 874.33 937.89 999.14
Farm Wages & Salaries Pension
>100,001 -2,434.08 -4,126.34 -19,474.67 -4,943.69 -8,068.91 -71,429.48 -4,277.33 -5,266.92 -9,600.76
75,001-100,000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
60,001-75,000 -1,997.43 -2,224.97 -2,496.74 -3,181.29 -3,527.70 -3,976.55 -1,649.96 -1,799.68 -2,062.41
40,001-60,000 -664.33 -779.46 -996.47 -1,012.75 -1,203.72 -1,519.09 -690.40 -801.43 -1,035.57
32,001-40,000 -215.14 -237.87 -268.92 -311.66 -345.70 -389.56 -193.30 -213.74 -241.62
30,001-32,000 671.17 691.87 715.89 965.83 996.75 1,030.19 580.57 599.07 619.25
26,001-30,000 -1,052.61 -1,129.94 -1,214.50 -1,369.39 -1,464.75 -1,580.00 -860.52 -921.82 -992.86
22,001-26,000 -135.42 -147.19 -160.03 -171.73 -186.15 -202.95 -110.67 -120.28 -130.78
16,001-22,000 110.54 129.77 151.99 118.50 138.68 162.93 92.96 109.25 127.81
12,001-16,000 707.62 806.54 943.41 707.19 816.13 942.85 629.86 724.40 839.74
10,501-12,000 947.06 1,009.33 1,082.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
